As a powerful tool in the production of knowledge, comparing plays a crucial part in the sciences and the humanities. This volume explores the relationship between comparing and narrating in epistemic practices and clarifies the ways in which narratives enable or impede practices of comparing. It takes into account related activities, such as measuring and classifying, modeling, establishing norms and categories, as well as organizing and popularizing knowledge, to analyze the ambivalent relationship between narratives, scientific explanation, and understanding. The contributions bring out the epistemic role of narratives, and elucidate how narratives are connected to comparisons and scientific explanations.

An introduction to the new area of ignorance studies that examines how science produces ignorance-both actively and passively, intentionally and unintentionally. We may think of science as our foremost producer of knowledge, but for the past decade, science has also been studied as an important source of ignorance. The historian of science Robert Proctor has coined the term agnotology to refer to the study of ignorance, and much of the ignorance studied in this new area is produced by science. Whether an active or passive construct, intended or unintended, this ignorance is, in Proctor's words, "made, maintained, and manipulated" by science. This volume examines forms of scientific ignorance and their consequences. A dialogue between Proctor and Peter Galison offers historical context, presenting the concerns and motivations of pioneers in the field. Essays by leading historians and philosophers of science examine the active construction of ignorance by biased design and interpretation of experiments and empirical studies, as seen in the "false advertising" by climate change deniers; the "virtuous" construction of ignorance-for example, by curtailing research on race- and gender-related cognitive differences; and ignorance as the unintended by-product of choices made in the research process, when rules, incentives, and methods encourage an emphasis on the beneficial and commercial effects of industrial chemicals, and when certain concepts and even certain groups' interests are inaccessible in a given conceptual framework. Contributors Martin Carrier, Carl F. Cranor, Peter Galison, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Philip Kitcher, Janet Kourany, Hugh Lacey, Robert Proctor, Londa Schiebinger, Miriam Solomon, Torsten Wilholt

We increasingly view the world around us as a product of science and technology. Accordingly, we have begun to appreciate that science does not take its problems only from nature and then produces technological applications, but that the very problems of scientific research themselves are generated by science and technology. Simultaneously, problems like global warming, the toxicology of nanoparticles, or the use of renewable energies are constituted by many factors that interact with great complexity. Science in the context of application is challenged to gain new understanding and control of such complexity it cannot seek shelter in the ivory tower or simply pursue its internal quest for understanding and gradual improvement of grand theories. Science in the Context of Application will identify, explore and assess these changes. Part I considers the "Changing Conditions of Scientific Research" and part II "Science, Values, and Society." Examples are drawn from pharmaceutical research, the information sciences, simulation modelling, nanotechnology, cancer research, the effects of commercialization, and many other fields. The book assembles papers from well-known European and American Science Studies scholars like Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Janet Kourany, Michael Mahoney, Margaret Morrison, Hans-Jorg Rheinberger, Arie Rip, Dan Sarewitz, Peter Weingart, and others. The individual chapters are written to address anyone who is concerned about the role of contemporary science in society, including scientists, philosophers, and policy makers."

Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2 Degrees Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe.

The fundamental question of whether, or in what sense, science informs us about the real world has pervaded the history of thought since antiquity. Is what science tells us about the world determined unambiguously by facts, or does the content of any scientific theory in some way depend on the human condition? "Sokal s hoax" attacked the mere seriousness of post-modern views of science and shifted this controversial debate to a new level, which very quickly came to be known as "Science Wars."

"Knowledge and the World" examines and reviews the broad range of philosophical positions on this issue, extending from realism to relativism, to expound the epistemic merit of t science, and to tackle the central question: in what sense can science justifiably claim to provide a truthful portrait of reality? Challenges beyond the Science Wars are taken up by contributions of scientists, sociologists and philosophers of science, which connect perspectives of a wide variety of disciplines (including biology and cultural studies). This book addresses everyone interested in the philosophy and history of science, and in particular in the interplay between the social and natural sciences.

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The fundamental question of whether, or in what sense, science informs us about the real world has pervaded the history of thought since antiquity. Is what science tells us about the world determined unambiguously by facts, or does the content of any scientific theory in some way depend on the human condition? "Sokal s hoax" attacked the mere seriousness of post-modern views of science and shifted this controversial debate to a new level, which very quickly came to be known as "Science Wars."

"Knowledge and the World" examines and reviews the broad range of philosophical positions on this issue, extending from realism to relativism, to expound the epistemic merit of t science, and to tackle the central question: in what sense can science justifiably claim to provide a truthful portrait of reality? Challenges beyond the Science Wars are taken up by contributions of scientists, sociologists and philosophers of science, which connect perspectives of a wide variety of disciplines (including biology and cultural studies). This book addresses everyone interested in the philosophy and history of science, and in particular in the interplay between the social and natural sciences.

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The Completeness of Scientific Theories deals with the role of theories in measurement. Theories are employed in measurements in order to account for the operation of the instruments and to correct the raw data obtained. These observation theories thus guarantee the reliability of measurement procedures. In special cases a theory can be used as its own observation theory. In such cases it is possible, relying on the theory itself, to analyze the measuring procedures associated with theoretical states specified within its framework. This feature is called completeness. The book addresses the assets and liabilities of theories exhibiting this feature. Chief among the prima-facie liabilities is a testability problem. If a theory that is supposed to explain certain measurement results at the same time provides the theoretical means necessary for obtaining these results, the threat of circularity arises. Closer investigation reveals that various circularity problems do indeed emerge in complete theories, but that these problems can generally be solved. Some methods for testing and confirming theories are developed and discussed. The particulars of complete theories are addressed using a variety of theories from the physical sciences and psychology as examples. The example developed in greatest detail is general relativity theory, which exhibits an outstanding degree of completeness. In this context a new approach to the issue of the conventionality of physical geometry is pursued. The book contains the first systematic analysis of completeness; it thus opens up new paths of research. For philosophers of science working on problems of confirmation, theory-ladenness of evidence, empiricaltestability, and space--time philosophy (or students in these areas).

We increasingly view the world around us as a product of science and technology. Accordingly, we have begun to appreciate that science does not take its problems only from nature and then produces technological applications, but that the very problems of scientific research themselves are generated by science and technology. Simultaneously, problems like global warming, the toxicology of nanoparticles, or the use of renewable energies are constituted by many factors that interact with great complexity. Science in the context of application is challenged to gain new understanding and control of such complexity it cannot seek shelter in the ivory tower or simply pursue its internal quest for understanding and gradual improvement of grand theories. Science in the Context of Application will identify, explore and assess these changes. Part I considers the "Changing Conditions of Scientific Research" and part II "Science, Values, and Society." Examples are drawn from pharmaceutical research, the information sciences, simulation modelling, nanotechnology, cancer research, the effects of commercialization, and many other fields. The book assembles papers from well-known European and American Science Studies scholars like Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Janet Kourany, Michael Mahoney, Margaret Morrison, Hans-Jorg Rheinberger, Arie Rip, Dan Sarewitz, Peter Weingart, and others. The individual chapters are written to address anyone who is concerned about the role of contemporary science in society, including scientists, philosophers, and policy makers."

This book analyzes the power variations between political executives in semi-presidential regimes. It contrasts institutional, partisan, and extra-institutional explanations and identifies patterns of change for the power distribution between presidents and prime ministers. It provides an empirical analysis of selected case studies and demonstrates the necessity to understand power variations in a configurative perspective, exposing the limits of institutional design explanations. This study ultimately aims to contribute to both the literature on semi-presidentialism and to the literature on democratic regimes by providing a systematic assessment of these different configurations, in both mature and emerging democracies. To explore this phenomenon, this research tests the key factors of power variation proposed in the semi-presidential literature on the power relationship between presidents and prime ministers mainly in France's Fifth Republic and post-1993 Ukraine, but also to a lesser extent in Finland, post-1993 Russia, and post-1990 Poland.

In The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice, philosophers, sociologists, and historians of science offer a multidisciplinary view of the complex interrelationships of values in science and society in both contemporary and historic contexts. They analyze the impact of commercialization and politicization on epistemic aspirations, and, conversely, the ethical dilemmas raised by \u201cpractically relevant\u201d science in today's society. For example, much scientific research over the past quarter century has been guided by the financing that supports it. What effect has this had on the quality of research produced and the advancement of real knowledge? The contributors reveal how social values affect objectivity, theory, and the direction of inquiry, and examine the byproducts of external value systems in topics such as \u201cexpertise\u201d and \u201csocially robust knowledge,\u201d among others. They view science's own internal value systems, the earlier disconnection of societal values from the scientific process, and the plausibility of \u201cvalue free\u201d science. The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice presents an in-depth analysis that places the role of values at the center of philosophical debate and raises questions of morality, credibility, and the future role of values in scientific inquiry.

Wissenschaftliches Wissen wird durch tatigen Eingriff in die Natur gewonnen: Um Homo Sapiens sein zu koennen, muss der Mensch zugleich Homo Faber sein. Im Anschluss an das philosophische Werk von Jurgen Mittelstrass begrunden und differenzieren die Beitrage des Bandes diese These sowohl in ihrer historischen als auch in ihrer systematischen Dimension (einschliesslich ihrer praktisch-philosophischen Implikationen).